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T
HE COLONIAL LEGACY OF BEING RULED for the benefit
of the colonizer meant that for most developing countries,
law enforcement agencies, especially the police, have yield-
ed great power. Pakistan falls into this category, as police
excesses have always been a problem. This article examines the extra-
legal activities of police in Pakistan, and the way the recent adminis-
trative and legal changes in the country, although well intentioned,
have the potential to strengthen police without enhancing accounta-
bility. However, if the proper changes are introduced, the right balance
can be struck between the need for police to have operational inde-
pendence and the need for demonstrable accountability.
Recently, the government of Pakistan has made efforts to
improve the police force nationwide. These efforts have not yet
improved the image of the police in the public eye. The common per-
son’s perception is that the police more often exploit the victim rather
than go after the criminal. Reports in the press about police torture are
still commonplace, despite recent efforts by the authorities to improve
police accountability. However, the silver lining is that the police offi-
cers involved in torture are being punished and that the Government
is making efforts to hold the police accountable. 
INTRODUCTION
IN PAKISTAN THE WAY A PERSON IS TREATED in the police precinct
is reflective of the local power structure of the area. In the case of a
minor theft or injury, most citizens do not report the crime for fear that
the police will engage in extortion. The extra-legal use of police for state
purposes is rare, however, the use of torture and illegal detention by
police is believed to be done for personal gain and to cover inefficien-
cy. Corruption is the root cause of this phenomenon. Any perusal of
the newspapers, reports of national and international human rights
NGOs, and reports such as the U.S. State Department’s annual human
rights report will illustrate that the police in Pakistan routinely misuse
their powers. As explained later in this article, the recent changes in the
legal and administrative structure of the country have made the police
more powerful, without making them more accountable.
Police in South Asia have traditionally been used as an instru-
ment for furthering state policy objectives. The Mughals and rulers
before them were absolute monarchs and did not believe themselves
answerable to the citizenry. The British, who enjoyed democracy at
home, did not consider the virtue important enough to be exported to
their colonies. As a foreign colonizer, they needed both the military as
well as para-military forces, including the police, to control the local
populace in the interests of the state. Consequently, the main purpose
of the police was not to fulfill a function of the state toward its peo-
ple, but rather to keep law and order in the interests of the colonizer.
This naturally set the background for the modern day police forces in
today’s South Asia. One of the most important legacies of British col-
onization is the institution of bureaucracy, and the police force is a
part of that legacy. Therefore, at the time of independence there was a
strong bureaucracy and weak governance, which resulted in a lack of
accountability mechanisms.
CURRENT LEGAL SITUATION
PAKISTAN IS A SIGNATORY TO THE UN CHARTER, which mentions
the promotion and protection of human rights as one of its objectives.
Pakistan is also a signatory to the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR). The UDHR is a declaration, and therefore non-
binding under international law. However, over the last half century
legal experts have come to believe that most of it has become part of
customary international law. 
Customary international law is state practice that states in gener-
al have come to accept as law, and therefore consider themselves
bound by it. The UDHR contains provisions on two broad categories
of rights: civil and political rights, and economic, social and cultural
rights. Civil and political rights “include the right to life, liberty, and
security of persons; the prohibition of slavery, of torture and cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment; the right not to be subjected to arbi-
trary arrest, detention or exile; the right to a fair trial in both civil and
criminal matters; the presumption of innocence and the prohibition
against the application of ex post facto laws and penalties.” 
TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMANE, OR
DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT
The Constitution of Pakistan forbids torture and other cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment. Although incidents of police torture
have decreased over the past few years, the leading national human
rights NGO in Pakistan, the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan
(HRCP), reports that, “the use of torture was extremely widespread in
the country—with both police and prison officials responsible for
inflicting it.” Some human rights groups are of the opinion that this
decrease is reflective of the influence of the army monitoring teams,
which discourage the use of torture. These monitoring teams were
instituted in 2000 to ensure good performance by civil departments.
ARBITRARY ARREST, DETENTION, OR EXILE
Article 10 of the Constitution of Pakistan prohibits arbitrary arrest
and detention. However, the police are often accused of arbitrarily arrest-
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ing and detaining citizens. There are reports that the junior police offi-
cials at Inspector level and below illegally detain suspects in order to
extort money from them and often move prisoners from one police sta-
tion to another if they suspect a surprise visit by higher police authorities. 
ENHANCED SECURITY CONCERNS
Due to the tragic and unfortunate events of September 11, 2001,
the worldwide security situation has changed, and internationally
security concerns sometimes outweigh human rights concerns. As a
result, police forces have gained increased power in countries all over
the world, including Pakistan. It is assumed by law enforcement agen-
cies that security can only be ensured at the cost of curtailment of
some human and due process rights. 
Conversely, in the opinion of leading international human rights
NGOs such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch,
security consists of not only protection from politically motivated vio-
lence but also of protection from arbitrary detention, freedom of
expression, and security of due process rights, among other rights. It is
therefore important that a state should provide both kinds of security
to its people.
2002 AMENDMENT TO THE ANTI-TERRORISM ACT-1997
The Amendment to the 1997 Anti–Terrorism Act of Pakistan
(Act) allows the detention of people suspected to be terrorists for up
to one year. It also allows for investigation of the accounts and prop-
erty of suspects. The Act defines a terrorist act very broadly. All laws
which infringe on the citizen’s liberty need to be narrowly defined,
otherwise there is a possibility of their misuse by the police. The state
in the post-September 11 scenario rightly feels that it needs to
strengthen its security apparatus to protect its citizens from politically
motivated violence. However, it should be done in such a way that due
process rights are not affected and police personnel are not given a
loophole to misuse their powers.
RECENT CHANGES IN THE POLICE AND ADMINISTRATIVE
STRUCTURE OF THE COUNTRY
Pakistan is a federation with four separate provinces and one fed-
erally administered area. In the police structure each of these divisions
is headed by an inspector-general of police. The smallest administra-
tive unit is the thana, or police precinct, headed by a police inspector. 
The Government of President Pervez Musharraf, introduced cer-
tain reforms into the administrative structure of the country and
replaced the 1896 Police Act with the Police Ordinance 2002
(Ordinance). This Ordinance has brought about many needed
changes in the century old Police Act. However, the new Police
Ordinance does not fully meet the requirements of the time and has
in some ways made the police stronger, especially in conjunction with
the recently introduced Devolution Plan, which has brought about
major administrative changes at the district level. There is much to
commend in the Devolution Plan, as it is based upon the democratic
principle of local participation in governance. However, the flip side
of the current situation is that it leaves the police more powerful and
less accountable. Interestingly, the Nazim, the political head of district
government under the Devolution Plan, has little control over the
police. This is juxtaposed with, for example, a mayor in the United
States of America who usually has significant control over public
departments of the city. The Nazim has a supervisory role over the
police, but lacks enforcement power. If the objective is to devolve
power to the local level, then an important aspect of devolution is the
maintenance of law and order, which has been denied to the elected
Nazim.
A significant number of police officers in Pakistan are federal
employees and are lent to the provincial governments for posting as
police officers. If they are not under the elected officials of the district
or the province, then their operational independence can lead to a lack
of accountability. Under the new Police Ordinance, the provincial
government does not have any significant say on who is to be appoint-
ed the inspector-general of police of a province. However, under the
Constitution of Pakistan, law and order are provincial subjects, and
the chief minister is the executive head of the provincial government.
Under Section 33 of the Police Ordinance 2002, the head of dis-
trict police shall be responsible to the District Nazim for police func-
tions; but this shall not include “administration of the district police,
investigation of criminal cases and police functions relating to prose-
cution,” which shall rest with the police. The Nazim may visit a police
station to find out if any person is under unlawful detention, and, in
appropriate cases, may also direct action in accordance with law.
However, the order does not state what will happen if the district
police officer disobeys the orders of the Nazim, other than that the
detainee can refer it to some authority without her or himself having
any enforcement power.
As mentioned above, the government has introduced a new dis-
trict administrative structure through its Devolution Plan. Key
changes include transferring oversight of the district superintendent of
police from provincially appointed district commissioners to elected
district mayors. The Plan allows the district police officer to order the
use of live fire on their own authority and establishes public safety
commissions, which have partial oversight over the district police. The
public safety commissions under this Ordinance exist at the district,
provincial and federal level. The commissions are to consist of
appointed members recommended by various bodies, such as the dis-
trict council and the provincial government. 
While the commissions has rightly transferred power to elected
officials, they have also strengthened the powers of the police. The
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Nazims and the public safety commissions have oversight powers over
the police, but they do not have any enforcement power. In an envi-
ronment where the police are prone to misuse their powers, it is nec-
essary to have mechanisms to control potential abuse. In addition, the
members of the public safety commissions are restricted to a single
term of three years, thereby ensuring complete turnover where no use
can be made of the experience acquired by members of the last com-
mission.
The district public safety commission’s task is to oversee com-
plaints against the police and evaluate police performance. However,
there is no concrete action that the commission can take against a
recalcitrant or errant police official, except referring the matter to the
provincial government or police complaint authority. Effectively, the
police have no authority controlling them, except their own hierarchy.
In Pakistan it is reported that police officers often protect their subor-
dinates, irrespective of their fault. In such situations, where the police
are beyond the control of both the Nazims and the provincial govern-
ment, they are likely to abuse their powers.
In Pakistan, politicians have tended to interfere in purely admin-
istrative and police affairs, and it is therefore understandable that the
government aims to make police immune from such interference.
However, the police must be held accountable for the use of their pow-
ers, and in the attempt to provide them with operational independ-
ence, they must be ruled unaccountable. There has to be a system of
effective checks and balances.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
IN ANY MODERN, DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY, it is important that the
people enjoy basic human dignity and the knowledge that they are
protected by properly-enforced laws. It is therefore imperative that
Pakistani police are brought within the realm of Pakistani law and
internationally acceptable standards for police conduct. In this regard
there are certain steps that must be taken to ensure that the national
police use their powers for the purpose for which the constitution
intended—that is, the maintenance of law and order within the ambit
of the law.
Mandatory action should be prescribed against recalcitrant
police officers. For example, in case of reported torture in a police sta-
tion, a report should be registered against the station house officer, and
upon the occurrence of two such cases in a subdivision, a report
should be filed against the assistant superintendent of police for crim-
inal negligence of duty.
Greater disciplinary and legal action should be taken against
police officials who misuse their powers, so that the corrupt are weed-
ed out of the service and the public have better confidence in the
force. In addition, the general perception that police officers protect
their subordinates to a fault needs to be addressed.
Civil society in Pakistan is small but vibrant and has already
withstood an attempt to be curtailed. Under the Nawaz Sharif regime,
an effort was made to ban a large number of NGOs. Civil society acts
as a watch-dog on governmental action on behalf of the people and
should therefore be encouraged to play a role in monitoring police
excesses and accountability. In this way, civil society can act as a bul-
wark against police excesses.
There is also a need to better train the police. In this regard,
refresher courses should be held for in-service officers, as they need to
be kept up to date with modern methods of crime detection as well as
sensitization on important issues such as human rights, women’s
rights, children’s rights, the rights of minorities, etc.
To hold the police accountable for their actions, a better mecha-
nism for accountability is required. This could be realized through the
establishment of a special police ombudsman at the district level, who
could deal exclusively with cases of police excesses. Until such a plan
is fully implemented, one ombudsman may look after two or three
districts. In addition, the civilian authority, that is, the provincial gov-
ernment and the Nazim, should have greater control over the police,
since control of police is an instrument of civil governance, not some-
thing beyond its authority.
The proposed public safety commissions should have more effec-
tive control over the police. Their role should not be just to recom-
mend action, but should be to effect change—that is, it should be
mandatory for higher authorities to take action on the commission’s
recommendation. The Nazim should be made the co-signer of the
annual confidential report of the district police officers, as this would
enhance the elected officials’ control over the police. 
The provincial police need to be administratively under the
provincial chief minister, as she or he is the head of the provincial gov-
ernment, and law and order is a provincial subject. The Executive of the
province cannot be truly effective without the police under its control.
With regard to the use of torture during investigations, it is rec-
ommended that the interrogation rooms in the police precincts be
equipped with cameras, so that the interrogatory process is taped. This
would go a long way toward controlling torture as an instrument of
interrogation. In addition, as in the case of Britain, this would also be
good for the police, as a confession made in front of the camera would
be difficult to retract.
Police in the West rarely wear uniforms unless on duty, and
detectives also do not wear uniforms. Given that the police uniform
instills fear in the Pakistan citizenry, the police should be made to wear
plainclothes when not on the beat. The police should also have a code,
as in the English legal system, which defines the procedure to be fol-
lowed by an officer while performing various duties such as arrest,
detention, and interrogation. Any violation of such a code should
result in an automatic initiation of disciplinary action against the
infringer. The Nazim and the concerned Public Safety Commission
should be kept informed of any such proceedings.
In cases where torture is proved, action should not only be taken
against the perpetrators, but also against the officers in charge of that
precinct for criminal negligence. In addition, there is a need to estab-
lish as many forensic laboratories as possible in the country, so that the
latest scientific tools are available for investigation of crimes.
Regarding the general perception that the police protect their fellow
officers, in cases of failure of the police to take action against an offi-
cer for misuse of power, the matter should automatically be referred to
an outside administrative authority. In addition, some inquiries
against police officers should be given to non-police personnel. In this
regard, the district coordination officer, the head of the district
bureaucracy, or the provincial government should be able to nominate
a member to the inquiry committee. HRB
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